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CHAPTER I 
BAOKGROOID 
During the Revolutionary War, our original thirteen states 
had the oommon bonds of ardent patriotism, and a foreign en..,. to 
give them a semblanoe ot unit,.. Aa .oon as the muskets 8top.,4 
their deadly ohatter, and the bar.s.ed red-ooat. retired to their 
Island acr081 the sea, thea .. common bonda vanished. W1th imminent 
danger ot I'ational destruction no longer confronting them. tlw 
States turnf'd to petty quarrels a..'11ong theuel.ve •• 1 
!be American stat.a, immediatel,. after th~ War, were .till 
100s.1'1 bound by the Articles of Oontederation. When the War MY-
aged the .ea-eo.st, these Articles aeemed to luffine); once the War 
was terminated, their 1nr~rent we.kn6 •••• became apparent_ Bot 
,-
only did the viotoriaua Amerl~ans tear monareh7, itselt,! but m&n7 
.sehawed any aOT.reign power that even reminded them of monarolq. 
With such tear of strong government prevalent in all the State., 
it 18 understandable that the ~xecutlve power should be, at beat, 
Ii 
lAl.Xis de Tocqueville, Democracl in Am.erlo& (New York, 1945)~ 
I, p,. U,). 
2Breck1nrldgeLong, Gene.llS of the Oonstitution at' the 'O'n1te4 
State • .9! W r1eJ., (Jew Torti, 112~T; p. ~,. - -
1 
2 
almost impotent un del' the ArM.oles. This .fear of monarohy was re-
sponsible for the many exeoutive oommittees. 3 
Since no power of taxation was granted to the f:~vernrnent, Oon-
GrGSS was foroed to request funds from the States. The dereliction 
of the states, in their refusal to contribute to the government, 
lef't the central government on the verge of bankruptoy. Under the 
Artioles, the States seemed more oonsoious of this freedom, than 
of' their obligation to the inohoate Nation as a whole. Lt-
The States oonsidered themselves sovereign. 1J.be Articles 
l~ovided for extradition, a praotioe that was usual between sover-
elgn Nations. Moreover, the oentral government was forced to rely 
on the States for revenue, and the enforcing of rights, titles, 
and interests in State Courts. Unf'ortunately, for the government, 
the States failed to send suffioient revenue, while In their state 
Courts, they reoognized only suoh la,~~ as· obtained in their re-
speotive States. " 
With suoh handioaps, the National government was unable to 
oonduot a vigorous foreign policy, or even to oommand the respect 
of observant EU'l'opean Ifations. Ii'ore1gn Countries 1'el t no assur-
ance whatever that the States would fulfill the G.groeeroonts made by 
the oentral govermnent. Ho foreign Country relishes treaties Vii th 
a. Nation, whose component parts ignored their oblIgations under the 
3Ibld • 212-213. 
h 
"Andrew C. !i:oLaughlin, A Constitutional History 2f !h!! United 
states (New Yorl!, 1935), pp. -l39-1Ii.l. .. 
.3 
r' 
IJ:'reaty of 178.3.~' Until the Artioles were disoarded in 1787, Eng-
land lived in the hope of regaining all she had lost 1n the War. 
At one time, it appeared that England's hopes were not in vain. 
As Professor MoLaughlin notes, it seemed that the states, onoe the 
fl~htinG was over, could not reoonoile themselves to their mutual 
inter-dependenoe. As the days went by. "disorganization rather 
tmn integ:ration,tt seemed to gather head-way, so that l'aen like 
JI 
C-eorge Viashington, and James Madi$On, te~ed i'oI' the1!' Country. t) 
Sound otttTenoy was unavailable. Rhode Island flooded the 
Country with worthless paper, while states enaoted laws foroing 
their oitizens to aocept pe.yment 1n wOI'thless tender. 
Under the Artioles, the Legisle. ture was further hampered by 
the provision that nine States must cast an affirmative vote to 
pass an Aot. This stipulation made it possible for the sumll 
states to blook any legislation they ~deem.ed oontrary to their in-
terests. 7 An absent state voted negatively. Amendment of the 
manifold flaws in the government was impossible, sinoe oonsent or 
all states was requisite for an Amendment. Pressure exerted by 
the delegates to the Annapolis ConventIon, for another gathering 
at Philadelphia, coerced Congress to aoquiesoe in the :::onstitu ... 
tional Convention. 
5Alfred H. Kelly, and Winfred A. Harbison, The Amerioan 
Constitution (New York, 19h8), pp. 106, 108-109.- , 
6 MoLaughlin, p. 138. 
7 ~. 140-141. 
1,_ 
While ConGress strove to mould the states into a powerful 
}Ta tion, American leaders expressed concern over the dismal 8i tua-
tion. As early as 1783, C~orge Washington feared for the future 
of rua Country. He desired sweeping Amendments in the Articles, 
or even a new Cons ti tution. He found Congress inept, and the 
Q 
states woefUlly selfish. u 
In 1786, Was h:tneton urged tba t adequa te powers be given to 
congress for the good of' the whole l1a tion. Those s tanding in the 
\Vay of strengtb&n1ng the National government, were either ignorant 
or designing. <) Althou€')l he wished to remain aloof from the "sea 
of troubles," it seems that Washington realized action could and 
would be taken. He could nnot oonoeive" how the United states 
oould survi va wi thout sonte Federal power the. t would. pervade the 
wbole Union with an authority like that ot the individual sta.te 
governments over their citisens. lO 
, 
Joh.''l Jay WE'O ttl to Gouverneur Morris, expressing his fears tor 
the national welfare: ttThe present ministry are duped by an opin-
ion 0:(' our not hs..ving union and energy- to retaliate their restrio ... 
tions. No tim.a is to be lost 1n raising and maintaining the Con-
federacyas to all general purposes •••• In Q word, everything con-
ducive to Union and Constitutional energy sl~uld be cultivated, 
n 
'-'Carl Van Doren, ThfJ Great Rehearsal (New York, 1948), p. 6. 
9Ibid• 
-
,.... 
oherished, and proteoted. nll 
No one, save I;Iadlson, realized the weaknesses of the govern-
ment, and the need for a powerful National authority more acutely 
than did Alexander Hamil ton, of New York. ffThere is hardly a oan, t 
he said, "who will not aclrnow1edge the Confederation unequal to a 
v1gorous proseoution of the War, or to the preservation of the 
Union in peaoe. The Federal government ..... will oontinually gttow 
weaker. n12 
Hamilton adamantly insisted on the need of stron!!, government. 
lf1rhe separate exertions of the states will never suf1'ice. Nothing 
but a well-proportioned exertion of the resouroes for the whole, 
under the direotion of a Common Counoil, with powelt suf'fieient to 
give e£1'1oaoy, can preserve us from belng a oonquered people." In 
a letter to another 1'1nan01&r, Robert Morris, Hamil ton uses typi-
cally strong language. He proposed ":~ Convention of all the 
states, with full power to alter and e.~end, finally and irrevooa-
bly, the present futile and senseless Confederation. n13 
In 1781, William Barton wrote a vigorous pamphlet, in which 
he insis ted that Congress should ltnot be left with the mere shadow 
of sovereign authority, without the right of exaoting obedienoe to 
their Ordlnances, and destitute of the means of exeouting their 
llGeorge Banoroft, H1.torl2f.2 Constitut1on O~ew York, 
1885), I, p. 64. 
12Ib1d• 
-
13Ib1d • 32. 
-
.... 
6 
resolves. nIl." 
Jal1:1es Madison, of Virginia, perhaps more clearly than all the 
o th.ars, realized and Imnented tbe weakness of the Artioles'" Like 
Har.111ton, he devoted himself to the cause of strengthening the 
goverru~ent.15 Indeed, from the moment the Articles were proclaim-
ed, ~,ladison foresaw the inevi table friction that Vlould harass both 
state and National governments. As early as illarch, 1781, young 
,Tames Madison addressed Congress, man1fes ting his l!een perception 
of the latent f'laws in the Articles: nThe Artioles of' Confedera-
tion, which declare that every State shall abide by the determin-
ations of Cont~ess, imply a general power vasted in Congress to 
enforce them, to ca:rry them into ef"f'ect. The United States in 
Congress assembled, being desirous, as far as possible, to cement 
and invigorate the F'ederal Union, recommend to the Legisla.ture of 
ewry State, to give authority tn emp~o'Y the force of' the United 
• 
States, as well by sea as by land, to ~ompe1 the States to f'ul:rill 
their Federal engagements. n16 
After the War, !,'iadison also deplored another dereot in the 
government, namely, that of' loyalty to the State, taldng preoed-
ll\.I!2.!!:! • 2l~ .. 
15From his knowledge of history and political soience, Madison 
saw the problems that would arise. Hamil ton was ever anxious to 
model the new government on the EnGlish monarcJ:"l...y. Thus, Hanilton 
VIas a little out of step with others who vllshed a stroneer gov ... 
ernn16nt, but more along Republican 11nes. 
16Baneroft, p. 23. 
7 
ence over loyalty to the Nation. In January, 1783, he and a fu-
ttU"e ally at the Convention, the talented James Wilson .. of Penn-
sylvania, asl:ced batt$r cooperation from the States on Congroession-
al r$quests :ror finances. He and Wilson deolared that loyalty to 
the Nation superseded loyalty to States and oonsti tuents. Ang;ry 
at Vixaginia t s fa! lure to sb.al'-e his sentiments, ?1adison firmly ex-
pressed his own oonviotions and adnronlahed his colleagues and 
their Legislatures. l7 
As the Counwy staggered into the depths of disuni ty, Madison 
Washington, Hamilton, and others, saw the necessity 1'01" a Conven-
tion, that WOUld, at least, amend the Articles. M"ad1son frequent-
ly reported to the former Commander 1n Chief. now in temporary re-
tirement at his beloved Mount Vernon. Both :reared that Congress 
would balk at any attempt to amend the Artioles, and forge a 
tlchain of iron. It Madison wrote Wash:togton, f'r'om New York: "Con-
• grass haa been much d1v1ded •••• On one ,slde, it bas been urged that 
some of the backward states have scruples against acoeding to it 
without some Constitutional sanction; on the other, that some 
states will consider any interferenoe of Congress as prooeeding 
from the same views whioh have hitherto aroused tl~ir jealous-
i n18 es. 
Madison was prudent in his oampaign for a radical change in 
l7~. 32. 
lBJamos Madison, Letters (New York:, 1884), I, p. 277. 
8 
the American government. He counseled Hamilton, and others, who 
strained at the leash to move slowly, lest their chances be scut-
tled by aroused reactionaries. Although Madison lamented the 
petty trade wars aml'lg the S ta tes J the jealousy of S ta te ,g;overn-
ments, and the paper money systems that deluged the land with low 
value green-baoks, he cautiously awaited favorable ocoasions to 
stress govaromen tal revision. Ask for little when there was littl« 
chance of obtaining eVen tha t, seek more as the sense of disaster 
begins to grow, and as the pace of National anarohy surpasses the 
feeble remedies acquiesoed in, others, too, will see the light,19 
Patiently, Madison fostered sentiment f'or a radioal change in 
the govert'll'nBu t. l?irst, he worked for a simple pOller of' Congress 
to tax imports. De.feated in that, he sought general Congressional 
oontrol over commeroe, next to seoure Virginia's call for the 
Annapolis Convention, and, finally t ¥>,ssek another Convention 
" 
vlith broader objectives than those of ~llnapolis. When Shay's re-
bellion jolted even the Conservatives out of their oomplaoency, 
Madison was ready for the bold course proposed to \Vash1ngton. 20 
By 1786, it seemed to Et~opeans, and many Amerioans, that the 
United states was a failure, destined to prove once and for all 
that Republican government was only a dream. Washington fretted 
at Mount Vernon, fearing that the Country he loved, and .for whioh 
19 Irving Brant, 
(1Jew Yorlc, 195o), p. James Madison Pather of the Consti tutton 12 -- , ..). 
20Ibid• 16. 
9 
he Imd devoted the best years of his life, was slowly strangling 
itself. The National Treasury was utterly empty, and the states 
were engaged in petty trade wars. Deoentralization had been 
aohieved wh..en the Colonios broke from the Empire. now 1 twas neo-
essary to draft a Constitution that would entitle the central gov-
ernment to suppress internal rebellions, to regulate trade, and to 
control the actions or the various state govex't'lIl'2nts. 
Congress, still deftly avoiding a Convent1on, again attempted 
Amendment oi' the Articles of Confederation, appointing a. "Gl'and-
Cornm.ittee lt to report such reoommendations as they thought neC0S-
sary_ This Committee recormnended only tbs.t Congress be given 
power to regulate commerce, and to colleot duties on imports. 
Sanotions would be imposed on States, default1ng in paying their 
reqUisitions promptly. Congress, however, was so moribund at the 
time, that no action was taken on ~~,prop08als. 
., 
Inexorably, Madison, and othors It s·teered the Country toward 
the Philadelphia Convention. In 1785, Vil'g1nia and Maryland had 
sigtl!)d an amiaable agreement, settli:lg their perennial disputes 
ovel' oontrol of the Potomao. So much did this 1nteI'-state agee-
mon'c please the two states, that another oommercial gathering was 
called, this time inoluding Pennsylvania and Delaware. Then, 
Virginia suggested that the other states be invited too, llnd that 
the Convention consider til oommon inter-state policy. 
'l'he .fanous Annapolis Convention met at Annapolis, l:laryland, 
septelnber, 1786. Although but seven states attended, Vi:adlson and 
10 
Hamilton used the meet1ng as a spring-board for calling a new Con-
vention. Hnmiltonts now famous words bespoke the purpose of the 
proposed Convention: ltto devise such further provisions as shall 
appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the Foeder-
a1 J~liaJ Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union. n 21 
Hamilton's words could be taken to mean a revision of the Articles 
of Confederation, although it is doubtful if the New Yorker ever 
hoped for less than a new Constitution. 
Congress reared that the meeting would further weaken the 
government. nevertheless, in l'4o"vember, 1786, Vil"ginia boldly 
adopted a l"8solution, calling upon the other states to send dele-
gates to Philadelphia. By Febtttlal"y, :fOUl' states :bs.d responded, so 
that a diffident Congress, peroeiving the inevitable, saved faoe 
with a s1m!l&!" recommendation for a Convention. Soon all the 
f:~tates, obdurate Rhode Island alone l'!3fra1ning, had elected dele-
gates to amend the Articles. 
With this stamp of Congt'essional approva.l upon the Convention, 
the dream of Madison, Washington, and Hamilton, was fulfilled. 
James Madison was the first delegate to arrive at the City of 
Brotherly Love, the 1b llowlng May. This vtas only us. t;ural in the 
man who had so ardently desired this gathering, and hoped to pre ... 
sent a plan embodying his ideas on the new Cons ti tu tion. As the 
other delegates tl"iokled into the C1 ty, Madison, and the Virginia 
21 Van DOl"en, p. 7. 
11 
group labored over the Virginia Plan, which in large part, would 
22 
emerge as ol.l.I'.fin1shed Gons ti tution. 
Besides Madison, fifty.five other delegates participated in 
the gathering at Philadelphia. Of these fifty-five, tIm major 
part of the drafting was done by a dozen men. O.f this dozen, 
Hadison was foremos t. A mediocre speaker, and of almost colorless 
appearance, he possessed a keen mind, and a wealth of scholarly 
erudition. He has been oalled the f'Father of the Conati tution ft 
because of the dominant role he played in forging a strong Hation ... 
al government, with authority not from thirteen testy sovereign .. 
ties, but .from the people of Ame~ica.23 This idea of a strong 
central govern~~nt resting not on tl» States, but on the people of 
the land, was the conviction for whioh Iladison fought throughout 
the Convention. 
lJ.lle Consti tution of the Un! ted ~tates has outlasted any sim-
ilar dooument known to history. This 1fJame Constitution suooeeded, 
where the Articles of Confederation failed booause it established 
strong National government, founded on the Amerioan people. Of all 
the men who contrlbu~d to the Philadelphia Convention, one alone 
deswves the title of rtPather o~ the Constitutlon. lt It is for 
this reason tm t this study traoes James Madison's doctrine of 
22 Andrew C. ldioLaughl.in, The Cont'ederation and the Cons ti tu-
~ (New York, 1905'), pp. 121 ... 122. ,- - -
23BdVlard l{;clTall Burns, James Mediaol}, Philosopher 2!. .2 
Cons ti tutlon O.ew Brunswick, 1935), P. 10" 
12 
Na. tiona1 sovereignty as he expressed it in Pl-:t11ade1phia, tha.t his-
torio summer of 1787. 
Before following Ma.dison through the Convention, it is neo-
essary to set the s tags upon whioh this American drama was enaot-
ed, to study the immortal actors, who joined Madison, in framing 
our Constitution. In any study or trw Convention, we are eter-
nally indebted to two of: the delegates for the notes tl1GY left to 
posteri 'by. I<':trst, we are indebted to James Madison, for his notes 
on the debates, ~afted diligently during the days of the Conven-
tion, and published posthumously for the benefit of scholars and 
patriots. Seoondly, we ~e indebted to a delegate from C~orgiaJ 
one William Pieree. 2~. 
Pierce left us brief and ooncise sketches of the important 
men who were outstanding in mouldIng our Constitution. About his 
own oharaoter, Pierce 1s silent, and prefers to leave those who 
ohoose. to speoulate on it. He clairns~for himself only the dis-
tinction o~ a military record. loyal service to state, and Country 
as a Congressman, and, ~lnally, his short sketches of the men who 
took part 1n tbs G:reat Debate. \Ve now s'Ul1'1l'rlarize the sketahes of 
Madison, and his more important colleagues. 
James Madison, Pierce writes, supplied the finest leadership, 
and, with the exoeption of James Wilson, his was the keenest in-
tellect. Though not an orator, he vias "a moat Q[;l"eeable sic 
24Doouments Illustrative of: the Formation of' the Union of' the 
A.merican State!!, ad. Char>les Tanilil ·~Washington,J:927). ,., - -
13 
eloquent, and oonvinoing speal{er-. tt On every debate, he was the 
best informed, and had the most correct know1odge of: the affairs 
of the United States. In Cong;ress, Madison was one of the ablest 
members t1that ever sat in that Council." About thirty-seven years 
of age, he was an agreeable person, modest in countenance, and ot 
controlled emotions. 25 
George Washington was esteemed by all as the Co~mander in 
Chief t of the late Amerioan Army. Having led the States to inde-
pendenoe and viotory, he again left his beloved eata te, to devote 
himself' to framing the goverrunent. Deliverer ot his Country, pol-
itioian, statesman, most honored citIzen, leader of men, all these 
was Washington. rn:16 General sought to make himse If usei'ul to his 
beloved Countrymen. It 1s only na tt.trtal that the delegates elected 
htm Presiding Officer of tl~ convention. 26 
James Wilson ranked among the fqremost in legal and po1itioal 
• 
acumen. Government was Wilson's consUtidng interest; he Ai tud:1ed 
everything that mi~~t make him more expert in political soience. 
He knew human natt.1r'e, the history of political institutions, the 
causes and effects of every Revolution, from the days of ancient 
Greece, until the Amerioan Revolution. Yet, Wilson was no orator. 
He was clear, oopious, and comprehonsive, drawing the attention of 
his listeners, not by eloquence, but by oogent reasoning. Vlhen thE 
lit· 
Convention opened, Wilson was still a young man in his forty-fifth 
year,27 
Another Pennsylvania delegate, whose prestige and wisdom fur-
ther enhanced the gathering, was Benjamin Franklin. Proolaimed 
the ~eatest philosopher of early Amerioa, he understood all tl~ 
operations of nature. Pierce almost defied him in adulatory ex-
uberanoe: ttthe very heavens obey him, and the clouds yield up 
their lightning to be imprisoned in his rod. n As yet, he had no 
claim to fame as a politician, nor did his interest extend to the 
frays of too pol! tical arena. Though eighty--two years old, his 
mind was sharp, his story-telling the highest at: entertainment. 28 
Also, trom Pennsylvania, was the verbose and c;arrulous 'Jouv-
evnetl!' MOI'ris. He was "one of those Genius's slott in whom the 
highest talents combined to malee him a conspicuous and sucoess.tul 
orator, His rhetoric was sublime, empellished with smooth tlowlng 
periods that enthralled his audienoe t6r hours on end. Even his 
reasoning was garbed in the lightsome simile and me taphov. Un-
fortunately, his logic left muoh to be desired. Ilnough brilliant 
of speeoh, widely read, and a savant of the Boiences, his thought 
\'J8.S ttrickle and inoonstant. tt Though bred to the Bar, he chose 
business with his Brother, Robert, in preference to the world of 
litigation. Gouverneur Morris was also conspiouous by his wooden 
27Ibid. 101. 
-
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lC:J; and badly marred arm, the results of a youthful accldent. 29 
Racer Sherman, to the Madison-Vl11son contingent, was the vil-
lain of the Great Debate. He exhibited the oddest sJ:mped charac-
ter Pierce had encountered. He was a strange oombination of awk ... 
wardness and forceful logic. His odd clothing,· the vulgarisms of 
his speech, and his Ustrange New r::ng1and oantn made his speeches 
almost laughable; yet, no man bad ua better heart or a clearer 
head. ft Victory was til bab! t with Sherman, failure a total stranger 
In early life, he was a oobbler. Ambitious and industrious, he 
became an Almanack pl'inter, a Judge, a Member of Congress, and .. 
now, at sixty was chosen to :represent his State in this highly 
touted gathering of patr1ots.30 
Alexander Hamilton, of Hew York, did not take a prominent 
part in the arguments. Still, he deserves mention as onG of' the 
most talented men to ride into Ph11a~elphia. A lawyer and f'inish-
, 
ed soholar, he had strong, clear jud~ent, smooth prose style. and 
an ability to win both the head and heart of his listener. His 
voice was feeble; but his deli very was oonvincing. Smell of stat-
ure, lean, and apparently vain, this talented New Yorker was then 
only thirty-three years of age. 31 
After l:fay 25th, the d&legates devoted two days to the details 
29Ibid• 101-102. 
-
30Ibid. 97 ... 98. 
31Ibld. 98 .... 99. 
-
16 
of organization and prooedure. George Washington was unanimously 
elected President of the prooeedinf~s; William Jackson was elected 
Secretary; and a COl11mittee of Hules was appointed. With Washing-
ton's eloction to the Presidenoy, Madison and the nationalists had 
already mn a Victory. Although he expressed hlmseli' only \'1118n 
necessary, Washington was convinced of the need for strong govern-
ment. "My wlsh is J n Washington wrote to !lJladison, ft tha t this Con-
ventien lnay adopt no temporizine expedients, but probe tl~ defects 
of the Oonstitution to the bottom, and provide a radical oure, 
whether agreed to or not."32 Jackson apparently suffered from 
over-work or sloth. As a result, we are Indebted to Madison for 
our best reoord of the debates. 
Once Officers bad been elected and prooedut'e settled, Mudison 
presented ~~s Virginia Plan, on May 29, through C~vernor Randolph. 
Since this Plan is oonsidered the v~r~ of Madison, and since it 
emerged in many respects as ow flnish~a Const! tution, we should 
unders tand the Plan, before embarking on a study of' the Convention. 
Randolph began by resolving that the Articles of Confedera-
tion should be "oorreoted and enlargedn to provide tf common defense, 
security of liberty and general welf'are. tf Thus, nothine is said 
to indicate that tlw Virgin1a delegation hoped to go beyond the 
authorization given by ConGress, namely, to revise the Articles. 
Hex t, he reso 1 ved that suffrage should be proportioned to the quo-
32 Bancroft, II, p. 5. 
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tas of' contribution or number of .free inhabitants. The National 
Lagislattwe was to consist of two branches, the first elected by 
the people of the States, the second by the !llEH:lbers of the first, 
out of' a num.ber of persons nominated by individual ~gislatures. 
As an indication that the Legislators would owe their first loyal-
ty to the National government, it was stipulated that they hold no 
offices established by a. State. 
IJhe Sixth Resolution of the Plan dealt with the National Leg-
islature. 'l'he new Legislature would possess "the Legislative 
rights vested in Congress by the Confederation, and, moreover, to 
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompe-
tent, or in which ~le harmony of the United States may be inter-
rupted by the exercise of' individual Legislation." Congress would 
also r~ve power of negative over State laws dee~ed contrary to the 
Constitution. If' any State tailed to~ follow the Consti tut1on, 
• foroe would be used by the 8.utmr1zati()n 01' the National Legisla-
ture. 33 
After the proposals f'or the Legislature, Randolph turned to 
the National E.xecutive. He (the Magis tra te) would be chosen by 
the National Legislature, would receive a fixed compensation, and 
oould be ineliGible for a second term. In addition to the duty to 
~xeeute the laws, ~le ~~ecutive would have all the powers vested in 
;ongress under the Articles.34 
18 
The Executive, with n chosen number of the National Judtciary, 
Vlould compose a Council of Revision with two-fold powers, namely, 
to examine the acts of the Legislature, before they shall operate, 
and to study every act of' a State Legislature, before a negat:i.ve 
shall be final. 35 
The Virginia Plan resolved tilat a National Judiciary be es-
tablished wi t11. one or more supreme tribunals and several inferior 
tribunals to be ohosen by the National Legisle. ture. The inferior 
Courts would hear in the .first instance, while the supreme would 
hear and determine in the dernier instanee.36 
The Plan provided for the admission of new states, stating 
that they could be admItted by the National Legisle.ttre with a 
J.'i1Qjori ty Hless than the whole" body. A Republican ropro of govern-
Tn.ent was to be guaranteed to each State.3? 
Provision was made for Con~ess ~to continue wi th all its au-
thority until the ftreformn of the Articles would be adopted. Pro-
vision should be made for amendment of tl~ proposed Articles of 
Union without the consent of the National Legislature. The LegIs-
lative, Exeoutive and Judiciary- powers within the states should be 
bound to support the Constitution. 
Finally, the Plan provided the. t the amendnK::1nts offered by 
3.5Ibid • 118. 
-
36Ibid• 
-
3? Ibid. 
-
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this Gonvention ought to be subml tted to an assembly or a.ssemblies 
of Hepresentati ves reoommended by t...~e several Legislatures to be 
expressly chosen by the people, Uto oonsider nnd deoide thereon."} 
':t.thls ra.dioal proposal, though submitted as a mere series of 
amendments to the Al:'ticles, was in real! ty a proposal for a neVi, 
powerful National government. It was Madison's answer to the 
problems besetting the governL~nt under the Artioles. This new 
proposal would have the government based not solely on the indi-
vidual S tatea, but upon the people of the Sta tea. In M.cLaughlin's 
opinion, the Plan ~rovided three most explioit answers to tl~ 
problems faoine the Nationt (l) the negative power of the Nation-
al Legislature over State laws oontravening "in its oplnlon tt the 
Articles of Union; (2) the power vested in the National Legisla-
ture to use .foroe against reoalei trant members not fulfilling 
their duties under the Articles of U11ion; (3) trl$ Legisla ti ve, 
" 
}i~xecutive and Judiciary powers wi thin ,-the States to be bound to 
support the Articles of Un10n. 39 
Prom a study of this Plan, r/e can infer Ma.dison's :poll tical 
philosophy at the Converl tiont s dawn. On many of his proposals, 
ho ,vas foreed to oompromise; on otmrs t his Dootl"lne evolved, and 
in years to come he ohanged l"adically. We are interested in his 
work ~Ol" a strong National government at the Convention, a govern-
39UcLaughlln, Constitutional Jlistory, pp. 155-157. 
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msnt that he hoped would mterlalize through proportional repres-
entation, a strong Executive, popular election of at least one 
branoh of the National Legislature which would in tt~n elect the 
i<;xecut1ve, and tm National negative. These, 1n our estimation, 
are the heart of the argtt.YJ1ent, and by studying them, we hope to 
present a clear outline of his politioal philosophy :tn the summer 
of 1787. 
The New Jezasey Plan, presented as a oounter-proposal to the 
Virginia Plan, was striotly a modification or the Articles. It 
would give Congress power to tax and regulate commerce; it pro-
vided for a better ays tem of requis1tlone i"rom the states by al-
lowing Congress to force states to pay if a majority of them agI'sec 
that force must be used. Undor this Plan, the States would select 
an F~ecutive of several persons who would appoint a Federal Judi-
ciary with power to hear in the firs~ instance cases Involving im-
• peach.'11ent of' Federal Officers, and to serve as Appalls. te Court in 
tho dernier instance .for cases involving the Pederal Government, 
!Jipacy, or foreIgners. ho 
All acts and treaties made by Congress would be the supreme 
law of the land for the States, when they involved tho States or 
their c1 tizens. The FederalE:xecuti va would be empowered to use 
force when a recalcitrant state refused to recognize this supreme 
law. Although such resolut;ions Vlould strengthen the £"overmnent. 
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the Plan did not go far enouc~h to please the Uationalists, mos't of 
whom came froLl the large States. The GOvernment vv'Ould still be 
based not on the people, but on the individual states, an(:- the 
evils of the Articlos would still harass the land. 
With a knowledge of the delegates, the procadut"e, the Offi-
cers, and the two opposine Plans I we are able to follow Madison 
through the vicissitudes of tho Convention, as he, more than any 
other man, moulds our Constitution into the "chain of' iron" which 
amazed the world. As both sides lined up ln !9?lm preparation for 
the taslt ahead, the words of the venerable leader of men in the 
President's chalr rang through Independence Hall. ttT'his event is 
ln the Hand of' God. fl 
In the Virginia State Convention, villen fic;h.tine :for ratifica-
tion of the oompleted ConstitutIon, Madison told the delegates 
"that tho organization of the general govertL.'1'lent was in all its 
parts difficult," and that "there was a peculiar difficulty in 
that of tl~ Exeoutive." In the Constitutional Convention, Janws 
Wilson had said, "this subject has greatly divided the House, and 
\'Jill also divide the people out of doors. ttl 
It is claar that th.e election of the Executive greatly puz-
zled our Founding }athers. Discussion of methods of eleotion of 
an I~xecutive runs through Madison t s notes like a thread. The sub-
ject was firs t mentIoned on Friday, June l, by James WiIsqn, when 
he moved that election be by the people, a motion that was opposed 
by ROGer Sherr:Jln, of connecticut. 2 Two week.s In tel', when the Com-
mi t tee of the Whole reported on the Virginia Plan, they incol"porat. 
ed the very words Handolph had used when speaking of the Executive 
I!to be chosen by the National Legis1atul'>e for the terrn. of 
----
~,'\a.x Parrand, nComprOl.~lises of' the Gonstitut:i.on,tt Amerioan 
Historical Association An.~ual Repor.!, I, (1903), p. 80. 
2Tansll1. p. 134. 
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years.") As it sIDod in this report, the method of election Vlould 
please no one, with the possible exception of the small States, 
providin~-;; the Senate had a prominent pa.rt in this clnice. 
Two days af'ter this report by the Comm.1 ttee of the \'V'hole, 
delega tes fx-om the larger States contended wi th those of ti1.e small 
over election of the Executive, The small States, confident that 
control of the Senate would be theirs, hoped likewise to control 
the Executive by having the National Legislature elect him, Con-
versely, delegates from the larger states hoped to have the people 
elect the Executive. While Martin and Shern'1Qo debated with morris 
raIson, and Pinckney, on election of' tho Executi va, Madison kept 
hIs peace, perhaps preparing what would be his longest speech in 
the Convention. On Thursday, July 19. Luther Martin moved that 
the Executive, since his election was by the Legislature, be in-
ellg1.ble for re-election,. lest he bec;ome too dependen t on those 
who ele cted h1m. " 
Ru:fus King then suggested that some torm of election by the 
people, possibly through ale ctora, would be best. This time 
Paterson's ideas were similar to those of King, He proposed that 
t:bree electors be allowed to a large State, one to a small, 
V!llson remarlmd that it was apparent that all feared election by 
the Legislature, unless the man be ineligible for a second term. 
lIe was delighted to see tlthat too idea was gaining ground, of an 
election media. tely or immedia tely by the people.,,4 
A t this point, Madison thought the time had coma for him to 
express h19 ideas on eleotion of a.n Executive. He began by re. 
minding ell that it was a fundamental principle of free government 
that tho Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary powers should be 
separately exercised, and it is just as fundamental that they be 
independently exercised. It is a necessary part of free govern-
ment that the F!xecut1ve be independent and separate from. the other 
branches. He explained that the coal1 tion of the two former power~ 
could be immed:tately dangerous to l1berty. To him it seemed essen" 
tial that the Exeoutive be elected by some source that would enablE 
him to be free fitom any dependenoe on the Legislature." 
Once Iiiadison established his point on separation of powers, 
he hastened to add that this separation could not exist if one 
branch ohos$ the other, that is. if o,na was dependent on the other, 
1 
He contended that even wi th Ineligiblltty for a second term, this 
procedure would wed the tv/o branches} intr1gu,es a.nd contentions 
would certainly follow. For these reasons. he was disposed to re-
fer the appointment to some other body. The people at large was, 
in his opinion, the finest body to elect the Exect1tl va. He pro-
fessed his fal th in the people as electors by concludin~~ that the 
people \vould choose a distinguished rJagistrate, whose nerits and 
4 Ibid. 412. 
-
I' 
!)atriotism had already rendered him va.luable to the He. tion. t) 
In this same speech, Madison act"'11itted one SGxwious difficulty 
in the popular election 01: a President. Since the northern states 
had a larger voting population than the southern, the latter could 
not duly influenoe the election. Thel:'ef'ore t he committed himself 
to election by electors, as the method open to the fewest objec" 
-{';ions.7 We must remember, however, that Uadlson considered the 
electoxwal method election by the people, since the people chose 
the electors. By popular election through the electors, he hoped 
to strengthen Ua. tional Government. 
Six days later, 'Madison thought the eleotion Shollld be by 
some speoial Quthori ty derived fl:'om the people, 01" by the people 
8 themselves.' He offered three objeotions to election by tl» Leg-
islature. In the first place, elect10n would diVide the Legisla-
ti ve, and publle interest would su.ff'e~. Seoondly, the candidate 
~lOuld intrigue wi th the Legislature $1n4" render his administration 
Isubservient to them. 'J!h1rdly, foreign powers could resort to in-
trigue and influence the ale otion. 9 
lior did he approve of election by state Legislatures, since 
lin this case, the F...xeouti va might be subservient to thase smaller 
6Ib1d• 
-
41.3. 
7Ib1d• 
-
3Ibid• 
-
~-49. 
9Ibid• 4h9-450. 
-
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Legislatures .10 
Madison insisted that the option was between electors chosen 
by the people and the people themselves. In both oases, the peo-
ple would control the election. He pre1'erred the mode whereby the 
people at large or the qualified part of them would choose the 
,-. ti 11 ;.'Jxe cu va. Despite the objections that people would be preju-
dioed in favor of oitizens of their ow~ State, and that the south-
ern states would have less voice in the election, Madison p!'e-
ferred it to all other alternatlv6s. 12 
As late as September 12, Hadlson was st!ll explaining his 
repugnance to Legislative eleotion of tl~ ExecutIve. I~ repeated 
the objection that suoh a procedure would render the Exeouti ve 
dependent on this other branoh. Nor were the Ju.dges fit electors 
.for similar reasons. The purpose of election by the people was to 
defend the Exeoutive and to "prevent ,popular or faotious 1nju8-
tice. tt13 
When the Committee on St,yle presented the1r dra~t of Execu-
tive eleotion, I4adison approved the wording, and oonfidently re-
markod: nHe is now to be elected by the people. It W1 th the Execu-
tive eleoted by the people, the first branoh of' the government 
10Ibid• 450. 
-
llIbid 
--
450-451. 
12
Ib1d_ 451-452. 
-l3Ib1d _. 715. 
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\"lOuld be Independent of State Legislatures ~ the National Legisla .. 
ture, the Judiciary, and an arbitrary handful ot eleotors.l~. 
By his arguments fo~ popular election of the F~ecutive, 
Madison hoped to s~engthen the oentral government. He and Wilson 
attempted to lodge as much powe~ as possible in the hands of the 
people. By giving power to the people, they l~ped to strengthen 
the National government, and prevent an excoss of power on the 
part of the states. Madison oonsistently refused to oountenanoe 
election by the Legislative or Judicial branohes of the National 
government, because this would hinder the separation and independ-
ence o:f the three branches. Throughout the Convention, r\~adison 
considered the granting of more power to the people the best way 
to strengthen the National government. 15 
Madison desired popularelectlon of the Exeoutive. A study 
of his arguments for the mode of elec,t1ng the Legislative branch 
• 
reveals that he also approved ot popular election of this branch 
of the govarnroont. To study Madison t s arguments for Legisla ti ve 
election, it will be neoessary to return to the early days of the 
Convention, and watch how tl~ discussions developed. 
In the Virginia. Plan~ Madison reoommended the. t the First 
House of the Legislature be elected by the people. This House 
would then ale ct the seoond House. Dy this expedient, tl1e people 
l!:'Fa:rrand, ftCompromisEls, n I, 82. 
15It seems that Madison hoped to v/eaken sta.te powers by 
transferring power to the people of' the Un! ted States. 
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and not the States would directly control the f'irst House, and in-
directly the seoond.16 On Ma.y 31, Roger Sherma.n m .... ose to objeot 
to popular election of' either branch of the National Legisla.ture. 
Since r~ thought the people easily mislead, he preferred election 
by the state Legislatures. Gerry t:lgl."eed wi th Sherman, but Wilson 
and Colonel Mason sided with the Virginia Plan. \>1;1l80n pointed 
out that no governroont could exist .ror long witlwut participation 
by the People. Furthermore, be believed that state Legislatures 
should be weakened, whereas Sl~rmants objection would give more 
power. 17 
Madison hastened to the assistance of Mason and Wilson, since 
he sincerely considered the "popular election of one branch of the 
lSational Legislat~e as essential to every plan of :free govern-
18 
ment. n He contended that the first branch, if' elected by the 
states, would be controlled by the states, and not by the people. 
If the first were elected by the pgopl.··, the people would control 
both branches, even if the second were elected by thf.:J firlld;. He 
thou [,;ht, too, that the ttg:r:'eat fabric to be raised ,vould be more 
stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of 
the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pil-
lars of' the Legislatures. n19 
125-126. 
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126-l27 • 
~~------------------------~ 
29 
Although Gerry again expressed disagreement, it was agreed by 
vote that the people should elect the f'irst branch of' the I':fa.tional 
Legisla.ture, but as the delegates were unable to a~ee on election 
of the second branch, the question was def'erred. 20 
Six da.ys la.ter, in Committee of the ~~role, Charles Pinckney 
:Joved that the tffirst branoh of the Na.tional Legislature be elect ... 
ed by the state Legislatures, and not by the people. If 'rhis motion 
was hastily seconded by John Rutledge, of South Carolina. Elbridge 
CT6rry expressed disagreel1lent \vi th this attempt to undo the affirm-
s. ti va vote by May 31. ~'requently, he said., the worst type of men 
belong to state Legislature, men who are not fit to elect the Na-
tional Legislature; f'urthermore, he insisted, it was neoessary I'OI' 
the people to elect at least one branch in order to inspire con-
fidenoe. 2l James Wilson added that the only reason representation 
was neoessary was that the people !n.8leb~ were too unwieldy to 
to conduct their government. He insisted that they would be more 
at taohed to a government of their own ohoosing. 22 Sherman arose 
to oontend that election by the people would abolish State Legis-
latures. He thought a binding force between state and national 
Legislatures could be established if the States elected the Hation .. 
al LegIslature. 23 
20Ibid• 127-129. 
-
21Ibid• 159-160 
-
22Ibid• 160. 
-23Ibid• 160-161. 
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After ~llilson and Mason, to the chagrin of Hoger Sherma.n, had 
defended popular election of the Legislature" Madison arose to 
bolster their arguments. So convinced was he of the necessity for 
election of' !l ~east one branch by the people, that he considered 
it a clear prinoiple or free gpver~ment. It avoided too great an 
21~ influence of' the State governments in the general one. tIe also 
begged to ditt'er from the member from Connecticut, Hoger Sherman, 
on his concept of the objects that required a National government. 
Sl1&rman admitted faction and oppression in the States. This very 
admission proved that the sphere of' the National .government should 
be enlarged. It was incumbent on us, he said, to try this pro-
posed remedy, and to frame a Republican system on such a scale and 
in suoh a rorm as will control all the evils experienoed. 25 
After Madison, Dickerson announced his concurrence with the 
delegate !'rom Virginia, the. tat leas~ one branch of the Legisla-
• ttlre should be chosen by t11$ people. Head and Wilson also Stlp-
!1Orted Uadison. When the vote was talcen on Plnclcney's proposa.l 
that the eleotion of the Legislature be not by the people, but by 
the states, it was defeated with only New Jersey, Connecticut, and 
South Carolina voti ng in the at'.firmative. 26 
'fl''lree months later, the Committee on Style reported that the 
161-163. 
161 ... 162. 
163-165. 
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lIou .. sa of Representatives shall be elected every second year by the 
people of tho several States. As f'or the Senate, tfi..,is branch 
Vlould be elected by the State Legislatl.:lres. 27 
Vle have seen that Madison hoped to strengthen the Fodoral 
;:overnment, and check the errant tendencies of the Sta tea by re-
posing the power of election of an Executive in the people at 
large. He also suooeeded in strengthening the government by al-
lowing the people to elect the Lower House. He Vlould have nre-
farred popular eleotion of' the Senate, or at least election by the 
Lower House, but un til the twentieth century, this l)1"anoh would be 
chosen by the Legisla tmoes. 
CHAPTER III 
THE FEDI~RAL NEGA TI VE 
In the Virginia Plan, submitted liay 29, there was a provision 
that the national Legislature "negative all laws passed by the 
several states, contravening in the opinion of the National I~gis­
lature the Articles of Union."l One authority on the Convention, 
says that the men who defended this proposed negative were still 
comparing the projected government with forlner Eri tish rule of' the 
Colonies. 2 James Madison considered it essential and "could not 
but regard an indefinite power to negative Legislative acts of' the 
states as absolutely necessary to a perfect system."3 
Madison's biographer says that in h1.s striving for a powerf'u1 
government, he won wl~re he deserved"to win, and lost whe~e he de-
served to lose. One argument he deserved to lose was his oonten-
tion for a Federal negative;h the plan was simply unworkable for 
myriad reasons,. It is no t the purpose of' this Chapter to defend 
ITansll1, p. 117. 
2!1CI.e.ugh11n, !h!. Confederation,. p. 206. 
311adison, Wri tinr:s, III, 121. Burns, Madison, p. 99. 
4-Brant, James Madison, pp. 128-131. 
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Madison t s ideas on the negative. To study his reasons for the 
negative is helpful, however, to an understanding of his Doctrine 
oi' st:rong National sovereignty. Yea:rs later, Madison would ref'Use 
to take responsibIlity for his defense of the negative j although 
five days bet'o:re the Convention adjou:r-ned, he still thought judi-
cial review was inadequate to prevent the states from disrupting 
the :F~deI'al Goverlll.U$ut. ;; 
The notes of Robert Yates report that Madison argued for a 
negative to avoid use of foroe. "To prevent this disagreeable ex-
pedient," Madison is quoted as saying, tithe power of negativing is 
absolutely neoessary--this is the only attractive p:rlnoiple whioh 
will retain its oentrifugal farce, and without this the planets 
will fly from their orbits.n6 
W{adison t s own notes on the debates discuss this same debate 
on the negative, and agree with Yates, that the first mention of 
it was June 8. The section is headed 1;1" Madison, nOn a reconsid ... 
eration of the cause giving the rlational Legislature a negative on 
suoh laws of the states as might be contrary to the Artioles of 
, 
Union, or rl'reaties with foreign Nations .117 By a Federal negative, 
:,;adison meant a power resident in the National Legislature whereby 
they could, in effect, nullify state laws. This power 1s similar 
5TanSi11, p. 717. 
r-,)~. 758. 
7 Ibid. 17l~. 
-
to judioial review as exercised by the Supl"eme Court today. Ac ... 
cording to Madison's plan, State laws would be deolared unoonsti-
t;utional by the National Legislature. 
Cha!'les Pinckney began the debate by a motion "that tho Na-
tional Legislature should have authority to negative all laws 
(,:l 
whioh they should judge to be improper. ItU (fh6 tenor Pinckney's 
argument manifests the ardor of' the South Carolinian for a govern-
[;lent to whioh the states could be wholly subordinate. 
Whan Pinckney surrendezted the floor, Madison seconded his mo-
tion. Madison oontended that an indefinite negative power on leg-
islative aots of the states was neoessa~J for a perfeot system of 
t 9 governmen· • He argued that government under the Artioles had 
taught American leaders several lessons, among them that the states 
oonstantly tended to in.fringe on the authority of the National Gov-
ernment. l'ratlonal treaties, he said. were violated with impunity; 
the rights of one state were ignored by- another; the vieaker party 
was always repressed. 10 He proposed a negative to meet these dif-
ficulties, as the wisest expedient for preventing state mischief. 
A negative power 'WOuld not only allow the government to deal with 
state enoroaohments, but would prevent the states from attempting 
to over-step their rights. He feared foroe if a negative ,vere not 
8~. 
9Ib1d• 
-
lOIb:td. 
-
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adopted. If Massaohusetts, for instanoe, would deoide to defy ·tills 
National Government, he feared the National forces could not oom-
pel her to yield, espeoially if she were aided by her neighbors. 1l 
Madison feared that the National army would not prevail under such 
c trcuma tanoss. I t seemed to him t..'la t a small port io n of the oom-
munity, acting on the defensive, could bid defianoe to the Nation-
al C~vernment at will. 12 
This proposed negative, Madison reiterated, would render tl~ 
use of foroe unneoessary. Nor would the states, if a negative 
were in tlw Constitution, defy the National authority. Bolstering 
his argument for a vigorous negative, Madison exhorted his con-
freres to a negative that would extend to all oases whatsoever. 
He then returned to his oherished illustration oJ: the planetary 
system, and again insisted that this proposed prerogative of the 
Hational Government was the one prin~1ple that DlUst counteract the 
centrifugal tendenoy of the States. W~thout a strong negative, 
the states would ndestroy the order and harmony of: the political 
system. ft 13 
Elbridge Gerry attaohed the negative plan. I~ feared suoh a 
power would enalave the states.:t.4 
Roger Sherman proposed an enumeration of cases in which a 
negative could be used. lS James Wilson defended Madison's posi-
tion. The negative, he insisted, when viewed with a steady and 
close eye, was rig pt. It seemed that there was little danger of 
hurting the states, but he feared the states would injure the 
whole and let local interests supersede National ones. 16 Dicken-
son also defended the negative lest the States again disrupt the 
whole. 11 DeMord, of Delaware. feared the negative was a menace 
to the small states. It seemed unreasonable to h1m for a National 
Legislature, miles away, to judge on the Constitutionality of 
state Legislation.18 
When Bedford's objection was made, Madison defended his posi-
tion. He admitted that the difficulties were worthy of attention, 
and ought to be answered before a vote was talien. As to Bedford's 
argument, he thou~~t a Board could b~ established in each state, 
• to give temporary approbation to laws ~hich seemed Constitutional, 
He suggested that the power of negativing be lodged in the Senate 
alone, so that the Lower House could adjourn more freqm ntly, 
Turning to Bedford, Madison asked what would happen if' the Nation-
a 1 Governrne nt oollapsed, He doubted it the small States would be 
1>Ibid. 176. 
-
16Ibid , 176-177. 
-
17 Ibid. 177. 
l8Ibid _. 177-178. 
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sater without its protectlon. 19 
Wnen a vote was taken on Pinokney's original proposal, it was 
passed in the negative, with only Virginia, Massachusetts, and 
PennsylvanIa voting aye. 20 
The issue again arose on July 17, when Gouverneur Morris at-
taoked the power as unneoessary. When Sherman and Martin joined 
the attack, Madison countered with a defense of his negatlve. 21 
This time he claimed tt'l...a.t a negative was essential to the security 
of t he general government. The necess ity of' general government 
prooeeded tor the tendenoy of states to proceed on their own. 
This propensit.y, he continued, would disturb the community, unless 
controlled. Only a negative could control it. Madison disagreed 
with Shermants opinion that state tribunals could control state 
Legislation, since in all the states, these tribunals were depend-
ent on Legislatures. In Georgia, for~ example, the Legislatu::r:>e an-
• 
nually appointed Judges to these Court.,~ In Rhode Island, the 
Judges were displaced by the LegIslature for defendIng the Arti-
cles of Confederatlon. 22 
A mild and perfect means, Madison olaimed, was necessary to 
cheek the states; such a means was the F'edera1 negative. Again he 
19Ibid• 178. 
-20Ibid _. 
21Ibid• 390-391. 
-22Ibid 
--
pointed to the Dr1 tiah system whioh revealed the utility of Q neg-
ative. Nothing else could maintain the harmony of the empire but 
the negative. l'l"or was the Crown loath to use this negative for 
the good of the whole. Every Act passed against the central gpv .. 
ernment was stifled in birth. He admitted some a.buse of this pre-
rogative, due to favoritism toward one or another part of the 8m ... 
pire, but he di d not believe the United States of the future would 
perpetrate such abuse. 23 
After Madison's arguments, Gouverneur Morris bluntly replied 
that the very proposal of such a measure Ylould disgust all the 
states.24 Pinckney, according to Madison's notes, defended the 
naga tlve. 25 When Pinckney surrendered the floor, another vote was 
taken. Again the measure was defeated, with Virginia, North Car-
olina, and l1assaohusetts voting affirmatively.26 
Immediately after the vote soun~ing the death knell of' the 
• Federal negative, l~.artln proposed that,·the Legislative Acts of: the 
Uni ted states be the supreme law 01: the land, and that the judi-
ciaries be oompelled to uphold them. Anything in the respeotive 
state laws to the contrary would be invalid. 27 This motion of: 
23Ibid• 
-
24Ibid• 391. 
-25Ib1d 
-* 
26Ibid 
-* 
27~. 391-392. 
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~'ls.rt:tnt s was a pel'feet answel' to Madison's vorl. sh f'or a check on 
sta te Legis lation. Although Madison co ntinued to defend the neg ... 
ative, it seems that Hartin's plan was, in this case, superior. 
Madison, in his zeal for strong central l?Pvernment, pre.ferred the 
National Legislature to state Courts as a curb on state Legisla-
tion.28 
As late as August 17, Pinckney I for the third time, suggested 
further dIsoussion of a negative power. Sherman, of Gonnecticut, 
. 
reminded Pinckney that the matter should rest, since Martin's plan 
was acceptable to the majority.29 Madison merely stated his oon-
tinued pref'erenoe for some form of negative.30 
James Wilson did not surrender as easily as Madison. He 
t;hought the firmness of Judges insuffiCient; P..6 was convinced of 
the expediency of a negative that could prevent the passage of 
laws, rather than a f'eeble power ths.t~ would declare them void when 
already passed.31 
Rutledge, Ellsworth, and Morris all spoke against Madison. 
~ll considered the negative impractical and unneoessary.32 \f.hen a 
vote was taken, New Hampshire and Delaware joined Virginia, Penn-
28Ibid• 6o~ .• 
-
29Ibid • 
.3°Ibid. 
-
31Ibid. 
-
32rbid. 604-605. 
-
sylvania, and Massaohusetts, in support of the nega ti ve; 'New Jer-
sey voted negatively. The doomed negative was again defeated, six 
to rive. 33 
r~ter in life, Madison attempted to avoid discussion of the 
negative. F'ive days before the Convention's olose, he was still 
suspioious, however, of judicial review as a oheck on State laws. 
In his notes, he quotes himself as saying, "A negs. ti ve on the 
state laws alone oould meet all the shapes which tb..ese could as-
sume. But this bad been over-ruled. "34 
In summary, then, it is obvious that Madison, during the Con-
vention, never relented in his arguments ror a negative. He pro-
posed that the National Legislature should review all state Leg-
islation. Any aots of state Legislatures that, in the opinion of 
the National Legislatt~e, oontravened the Constitution, could be 
negatIved. As is obvious, Madisonts ylan received little support • 
• Instead, Martin's judicial review was fl'dopted. Despite the peren-
nial dIfficulties between Legislatures, Congress and Courts, Mar ... 
tint s plan seems to have worked in most instances. Madison's 
heated a~gunwnts tor a Federal negative revealed his zeal for a 
strong Pederal Government; his distrust of state as a check on 
state Legislation, revealed his distrust of excessive decentrali. 
zation. 
33Ibid• 605. 
-
34rbid. 717. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A STROUG YET RESPONSIBIE EXECUTIVE 
In forging a strong central government. based on the people 
of the states, Madison realized the need of a strong Executive, 
who was at the same time responsible to the people and Con~ess 
for his actions. l At the time of the Convention, there was a gen-
eral fear of the Executive branch of government. 'TIm Articles had 
provided for committees to serve as executive, and a few of the 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention feared a strong Execu-
tive lest the Executive, or Executives, evolve into some form of 
monarohy. 2 
On the whole, the Convention seemed to favor a strons F...xecu-
tive, although a minority feared the '~a~vent of despotism •• 'Most 
~. . 
delegates realized how dismal had been the failure of the F,xecu-
tive Committees under the Articles, but misgivings about possible 
monarchy could be effaced by adequate safe-guards. It was abso-
lutely neoessa.ry to make the Executive eagel:' to comply with tl1.O 
demands of his Country. Such expedients as a suitable term of of-
lBurns I 139 II 
2F8.rl"and, ftCompl"omises,t1 80. 
fice, responsibility to the people tor election and re-eleotion, a 
balance of power between the three branches of government, and the 
possibilIty of impeachment, were thought suitable to harness Exeo-
utive independence.) Altl~ugh a strong Executive was absolutely 
neoessary tor a strong government, too strong an Executive would 
defeat the purpose of Republican rule. Madison realized the need 
of a balanoe between the two, the necessity of a strong Exeoutive 
and responsibility to the American people. Throughout the Conven-
tion, in his efforts to establish a powerful government, he argu.ed 
I! for a strong Exeoutive surrounded by adequate safe-guards. 'i 
The first time Madison spoke on the Exoouti va branch, was 
June 1, when the Committee of the Whole took up Resolution 7, of 
the Vu-ginia Plan." Cb.a.rles Pinckney, who opened the discussion 
by expressing the desu-e tor a strong F,xecutive, lnade clear, how-
ever, that he feared any form of' mon~chy. 6 
After Pinokney.s remarks, James \V1lson narrowed the disous-
sion w1 th his motion that the Executive consist of one person. G. 
C. Pinckney seoonded this motion.7 Benjamin ITank11n interrupted 
3~. 161. 
4-Burns, J.44. 
5 Tans!11, 133. 
6Ibid• 131. 
-
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Fl the px-ooeedings to remark on the importance of this subjeot. ,,J 
Wilson haa tedly arguod with Sherman. Randolph, and Ge~~y, over the 
neesss ity tor a single Executive. 9 Those who opposed Vl1lson's mo-
tion, did so on the grounds that an Bxecutive, if one person, 
could be the foetus of mona~chy.lO So heated was this dispute 
over the Executive, that the question was dropped, by common con-
sent, until all could prepare further arguments for their posi-
tions. ll 
Madison suggested the propriety ot establishing the extent of 
T~ecutive autho~ity before settling the question ot unity or plu. 
rallty.l2 He thought a definition of Executive powers would clar-
ify the need for one, or for several Exeoutives. He moved that 
the National Executive have powers to execute the trational laws, 
to appoint to offices not otherwise provided for, and to execute 
such other powers "not Legislative no~Judlciary in their natt~e, 
as may from time to time be delegated bi the National Legisla-
ture. Hl3 Wilson seconded the motion. c. C. Pinckney moved that 
the 19 words quoted above be dropped as superfluous. Hadison. 3.0-
llIb1d. 133. 
l2Ibid• 
-
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ceded to this motion. l4 The i'irat part o~ h1s motion was immedi-
ately agreed to.15 
The next day the inevitable question of impeachment arose. 
James Dickenson moved that the Executive be t*emoved by the Nation-
al Legislature on request of a majority of' State Legialaturea. l6 
Bedrord and Sherman agreed with Dickenson. Madison, however. 
feared auch an expedient would produce an equality of' agency in 
~~ 
small and large States; and he feared that a minority of the peo-
ple might thus remove the highest Federal officer. Moreover, he 
feared that it might open the door to intrigue against him in 
states where his policies, though just. might be unpopular. YJ1l-
son joined him in objection to such a mixture of state and Nation-
al authorities. l7 \~n Q vote was taken on Dickenson's motion, 
all the States, save Delaware, voted it down. lS 
On July 20, Madison again expres~ed himself on the question 
• 
or impeachment. He thought some words "should be incorporated into 
the Consti tution, explaining that impeachment was meant to defend 
the OOIllnlunlty against the inoapacity, negligence, or perfidy or 
the Chief' Magistrate. Althou€')l Madison was .for a strong. inde-
14Ibid• 13.3 .... 1.34. 
15Ibid• 134. 
-
l6Ibid• 141. 
17~. 142. 
l8Ibid• Jl~3. 
-
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pendent Exeoutive, he thou~)tt impeaohment vital to free govern-
ment. He enumerated the three oases where he thought impeaohment 
neoessary_ Limitation of the President.s term was not enough. He 
might betray the Nation to foreign powers; his health might break; 
he might reign despotioally. In any of these oases J impeaohment 
was neoessary. In the Legislaturo, it was diffioult for many to 
betray their trust or lose their oapaoity; the soundness of the 
majority would maintain the integrity and ability of the Legisla-
ture. The F..xeoutive, however, was amninistered by one man. Loss 
of oapaoity, corruption, or despotism on his part might prove fa-
tal to the Nation. l9 
After Madison had so expressed his desire tor impeacbment, a 
vote was taken. As yet, it was not deoided !2! the Executive 
would be impeached. That ~ form of impeachment be incorporated 
into the Conetitution, all voted aye t exoept Massachusetts, and 
south Carolina. 20 " 
Madison's biographer says Madison guided the Convention's 
thought on another expedient to strengthen tl-J8 Exeeutive--the 
veto. 2l Gerry opened discussion of a veto on .Tune t~. He proposed 
that the National Exeoutive have power to negative acts of the 
Legis lature not afterwards re-passed ttby ___ . parts of each 
20Ib1d• 421. 
21Brant , 40. Burns, 6!1 .• 
r 
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22 branoh of the National Leg1s1at'U.JJe. tt Wilson and Hamilton sug .... 
gested an absolute EXeoutive veto. 23 
Benjsain Pranklin reminded all of' the danger of such an abso-
21, lute power in the hands of' one man. ~ Sherman was against giving 
the Executive such pov"er. 25 Madison agreed with the suggestion 
for over-ruling an Exeoutive veto by a proper proportion of the 
Leeislature. Few Exeout'.ves would defy the Legislature. He said 
that an absolute negative would certainly be obnoxious to the peo-
pIe, at least in their present aversion to any form ot monarohy. 
However, Madison was clearly an exponent of' an 'Rxeoutive veto as 
another means of strengthening the National Gover~~nt.26 
Vnwn a vote was taken, every state voted negatively on the 
motion that an absolute veto power be gttanted, but the issue of 
allowing two-thirds of the Legislature to over-rule the revision-
ary cback passed in the affirmat'.ve. ~7 
There was no more discussion of the Exeoutive, until 3uly 
17. All agreed that the F~ecutive should have power to execute 
the Uational laws, to appoint to offices not provided for, that 
22Tana ill, 147. 
23Ibid• 147-148. 
-
24Ib1d• 148. 
-
25Ib1d• 
26Ib1d• 
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1~ be elected by a National Legislature. It was also agreed to 
eliminate the clause of ineligibility for a second term since this 
would make the Executive more anxious to please the peoPle. 28 
The delegates then turned to discussion of the Executive's 
term. Doctor MeC lurg and Gouverneur Morris moved the. t the F:xecu-
tive hold of rice "during good behaviox-. n29 This motion oort'ii'led 
those with leas monarchial leanings. Shel'rnan said that the Exec-
utive, now eligible fol' a second term, was already destined to 
hold office during good behaviour. 30 Madison repeated his previ-
ous arguments rox- a strong and responsible Executive. It was most 
essential to liberty, said Madison, that the Bxecutlve, Legisla-
tive, and Judiciary powers be se~ate. It was essential to a 
maintenance of this separation that they be independent of each 
other, but the Executive could not be independent of the Legisla-
ture if dependent on it for re-eleot1:.on. Suoh a. dependence would 
• 
make the Leg1slatUl"'6 not only the tnak~, but, 1tl aff'ect, the ex .. 
eoutor of the laws. Ty:rann1oal laws would be TI1B.de. he .feared, and 
oarried ou~ in a tyrannioal manner.3l 
Madison thought tOOl'6 was, in several respects, an analogy 
28Ib1d 
-" 
396. 
29!!?ll. 396-397. 
30Ib1d• 397. 
31Ibid• 397-398. 
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between the Exeoutive and Judloiaroy depat'tments.32 The latter ex-
€louted certain laws, the former others. The fermer expounded and 
applied them for cerots.in purposes, as the latter did 1"01' others. 
'nne difference between them seemed to oonsist ohiefly in two oir-
oumstances--the collective interests and security were much more 
in the power of tbe Executive than the Judioiary department. Sec-
ondly, 1n e.dministvation the Executive had mora latitude for dis-
cretion ~lan the Judiciary. Iw consIdered it absolutely necessary 
for a well constItuted Nation, the. t the Legisle. ture and Executive 
department s be separated completely. Doctor MoClurg's motion 
aimed at keep1ng the Executive free from dependence on the Legis-
lative department, and such a motion demanded fair bearine, al-
though it was another question whether it was workable or not. 33 
Colonel Mason objected strenuously to Madisonts arguments, on 
the ground that tenure during good b~havlour was comparable to 
• tenure for life. No State, he was s~, would acoept such flirta-
tion with lUonarohy.34 At Mason's insinuations, Madison again was 
on his feet. His real a1m, he said, was to prevent the introduo-
tion of monarchy. He had no fear of being considered a monarchist 
32Ibid• In a foot-no te 1 Madison explains that these views 
were inser~ed to parry objecvions likely to fallon Doctor 
McClurg t s motion that the Exeoutive hold office during good be-
haviour. McClurg. s reason was desire to make the I~ecutive inde-
pendent of the Legislature. As we have seen, Llad:i.son concurred 
wit h this, and preferred to have the people ele ct the Exeouti va. 
33Ibid• 397-398. 
-
34Ibid• 398. 
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He hoped to obviate the dangerous tendency in our government to 
throw all to the Legislative branoh. He warned that future revo-
lutions would tollow unless this trend toward Legislative omnipo-
tenoe were ohecked. In devising a Republican gpvernment, he urged 
all to keep in view the basic principles of such government. 35 
MoClurg supported Madison's renmrl~ by expressing his hatred 
of monarchy. I~ was zealous, however, to make the Exeoutive in-
dependent of the Legislatwe in the Republican form ot f:Pvernment 
they hoped to erect. Therefore, he repeated his preference for 
Exeoutive tenure during good behaviour.36 Tbis motion was passed 
in the negative. 37 
In Madison's defense of McClurg, he again showed his desire 
for a strong government with a strong Executive. Four days later 
l~ would show this preference again. On July 21, Wilson moved 
that the Executive be Joined to the ~udiolary in the revisionary 
power. Madison quiokly seconded thi~ 'll1<?tion.38 He thought the 
motion of "great importanoe to the meditated Const1tut10n. n39 It 
would enable the Judicial department to inspire additional confi-
dence against Ilegislative encroaoh."JlEmt. It would enable the Leg ... 
35Ibid 
_<Ie 398 ... 399. 
36Ibid. 399. 
-
37 Ibid. 
-
38Ibid. 422-423-
-
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islative department to preserve the integrity of public servants. 
It would enable the whole community to guard against unwise and 
unjust measures. He rejected the objection that this gave too 
much power to the E!xeoutl va and Judicial departments. The real 
danger, he repeated, was too strong a Legislature. Every power 
given to the other departments was a step in the right direction. 
Nor did he consider the proposed revision with the Judges any vio .... 
lation of separatIon of ~~eoutiv. and Judicial branol19s. On the 
contrary, he thought such association in the revisionary power 
would further preolude any encroachments of one department on the 
other, and would serve to maintain distinotion of the three bran-
ohes. If such a union were an improper m1xtLwe of powers, then it 
seemed to him equally improper to allow the Executive any partici-
pation whateV81' in the making of laws, and the revisionary plan 
should be disoarded altogether. ItO 
This pttoposed plan o£ Judicial asilociation v/ith the 1~.xecut1ve 
in revision of laws, championed by Madison and Wilson, was defeat-
ed with only Connecticut and V1rg1rd.a voting in the afflrme.tive.~·l 
T11l"oughout the Convention, Madison f'ought to forti.fy the cen-
tral gOV91'nnwnt by giving vast powetts to the Bxeoutive. At the 
same time he sug.gested checks on the T:xeoutive's independenoe. 
¥;!hile he agreed that the Bxeouti ve, ii' negligent or incapable I 
hOIbid. h23-tr·21.: .• 
4.l Ibid. L129. 
-
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should be impeached; be was careful. however, toenume:rate oases 
when impeachment was deemed neoessary. Most important of all, he 
insisted t~At the State Legislatures have no part in tl~ proceed-
ings. 'rhis was another exartJ.ple of his desire to weaken "the powers 
of the S ta. tes • 
.., 
14adison was instrumental in incorporating the famous veto 
power into OlW Constitution. Prudently he opposed the absolute 
veto, that is, the veto which does not include the provision that 
for re-passage, two-thirds of the Legislature must vote aye. The 
purpose of the veto was to prevent TAgislative despotism. Sinoe 
the Executive was responsible to the people alone, and not to 
states or state Legislatures, the veto power enhanoed the power of 
the National Government. 
In Madison's defense of McClurg's argtUuents for tenure dwing 
good behaviot~, he a~in indicated his preference for a strong, 
" independent Magistl'ate. Under such a system the gxecutive would 
have no worry about what the State Legislatures or the Senate 
thought. He could follow his oonscienoe. It was the people who 
determined Good beb.aviour. 
Madison and Wilson also hoped to j01n the :E;xecutive with the 
Judges in the l'evisionary power, but their argument was not ac-
cepted by the other delegates. Madison supported this participa-
tion of the F..xecutive in rev:i.sion of laws as another means of 
strengthening the Bxecutive. Throughout the Convention, Madison 
argued time and time again for a vigorous Chier Magistra. te. These 
52 
m.yriad argu.roonts refle cted his desire :ror strong central rule. 
C IIA P'l'BR V 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
In discussing Congressional represontat ion, Hedison dei'ended 
proportional representation, that is, representation based on the 
number of' people in a state. He prei'erred this plan of' represen-
tation to that based on the states. l Under tb..e Articles, there 
was equality of' su.ffrage; under Madisonts new plan this system 
would be abolished. Prom the out-set, Madison souf)1t to convinoe 
his oonfreres that proportional representation was an important 
pillar in the National Government. As early as 111ay 30, he moved 
that "the equality of suITrago establist~ed by the Articles of Can .... 
federat ion ought not tc prevail in the National Legislature, and 
that an equitable ratio of represont~tion ought to be sub~titu­
ted. n2 
Georse Read imnediately objected to this early proposal. He 
reuunded the delegates tl~t Delaware had issued speoif'io instruo-
tions against any change of sufiraga. If Delaware' s w~.shes were 
ITansl11, 123-124. 
? 
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not respected, he threatened to withdraw.3 Gouverneur Morris re .... 
gretted the imminent danger of Delaware's secession, but with a 
touoh of saraiSffi, he I"emlnded them that if disoussion of sui'frage 
offended them, suah discussion, nevertheless, was necessary to tl'l...8 
" success of the Convention. Ii-
Madison interposed an observation. Whatever the reason for 
equality of suffrage under the Articles, he thought it should 
cease when a National Government replaced a Federal. In the for-
mer case, he sald, the government was wholly dependent on the 
States; in this case, it would be dependent on the people.5 There 
was as much reason for proportional representation in the National 
Legislature as there was for dlf1'erent representation in a state 
Legislature of Counties of dif'f'erentsizGs. After Madison's 
speech, all agreed to postpone discussion of representation. 6 
Three weeks later, Madison agaip-.defended proportional rep-
• 
resentation. The men .from new Jersey "and Delaware thought it un-
just to allow V~ginia a greater vote than Delaware. Madison re-
minded them that Virginia was sixteen times the size of Delaware. 
These same men oonsidered it just to allow Virginia, with its 
sprawling territory, the same amount of representation as little 
3Ibid• 
-
123. 
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Delaw~e. He attaoked the whispered proposals o£ some small state 
men to divide the Nation into Thirteen separate but equal States. 
This was impraotioal sinoe the manners, modes of land tenu.re, hab. 
its and prejudices in the states differed. A voluntary amalgama-
tion of small states with their neighbors would be more oonvenient 
ror the Country as a whole. He reminded them of the imminent en-
trance of Western states into the Union, which States, upon en ... 
trance, wottld have few citizens. If' proportional representation 
were adopted, these S~ates ~uld not be able to rule the old.7 
On June 27, and 28, Martin delivered one of hiB verbose 
speeohes on State sovereignty.8 John Lansing and John Dayton a-
greed with him that suffrage under the new government shOUld be 
the srune as the old, that is, equal votes for each state.9 Hugh 
Yi illiarnson, of Horth Carolina, reminded them of the danger of 
\"Testern states; if equality of suffrti!ge were adopted, he feared 
the new States might rule the old. lO ". 
Madison professed a desire to oonour in any expedient that 
would remove the diffieulty over representation, but the argu-
raents just advanoed seemed unjust. £Ior vias equal suf'frage nec-
essary f'or the proteotion of the rights of} the small states. He 
7 Ibid. 226-234. 
-
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reminded them that Paterson's plan of land division demonstrated 
Patersonts realization of tl~ injustice of equal sufrra09. Al-
though foreign Countries dealt with all Uations as equals, they 
would not allow a minority of their people to dominate a majority. 
He repeated his example of the proportionate representation of' 
Counties. The States should have proportional representation in 
Congress, just as Counties have proportional representation with-
in a State. ll 
Madison belittled the fear of some that larger states might 
unite; for such a union, oommon grounds were necessary, suoh as 
similar OI'OPS and similar ou.stoms. The larger States, aooording 
to h1s oalculations, had none of these. They dif'fered in manners, 
religions, orops, and other oircumstances necessary for unity. 
For example, he reminded them that the staple of Massachusetts 
was fish, that of Pennsylvania, rlour~, that of' Virginia, tobacoo • 
• Mere equality in size could not surmount inequality of l'esouroes. 
He used an historioal example. G9.I'thage and Rome WE):re simultane-
ously powerful. Instead of' concord, they were ravaged by the 
Punio Wars. l2 
It seemed to !1tadison tP..s.t two extremes .faoed the Deputies; 
either perfect separation or oomplete inoorporation of the States. 
In the first oase, they 'WOuld be independent states, subjeot only 
111b1d• 290-294. 
-
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to the law of Nations. In the latter case, the States in tit Iiation 
would approximate Counties in a state. !f t;:ta small statos ware 
wise, he said, they \\Ould seek safety in a government, wl1.ereby all 
the states, large and small, would assooiate as Counties within a 
13 state. 
He rem.inded the small states of the danger of government, 
whereby all the states would live in equality. He warned them of 
dangers to 81'l1all States if' the general government were too feeble. 
In suoh a ease, the large states would distrust the government, 
and "ould be tempted to take ati'airs into their own bands. If the 
131:18.11 States supported a strong government. some day partition of 
the large states might take plaoe. 14 
James Wilson added that those who advooated equality of large 
and small states were advooating the sarns expedient which perpet-
uated the "rotten borroughs. tt He thought the bes t way to protect 
the oitizens o£ a small state was to allow proportional represen-
tation. 
Roger Sherman insisted tl1.8.t the issue touched the rlgb.ts of 
men. The best way to proteot the citizens was to allow equal rep-
resentation, even if' the larger states were forced to sacrif'ice 
what they oonsidered the 11" right to a larger vote .15 Vll1EH1 a vote 
293-294. 
294-295. 
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was taken, the motion to perpetuate the aye tem under the Articles 
was rejeoted six to four. 16 
Although as explained above, a compromise committee drew up a 
plan to settle the issue of representation, Madison was never 
wholly reoonoiled to the compromise which allowed equal suffrage 
in the Upper House. V1ben Charles Pinoltney moved, on July 14, that 
instead of equality or voting power, the states be represented in 
the Upper House aocording tiO population, J;htdison hastily seconded 
the mot ion. 17 He voioed apprehension that if the proper founda-
tion of government was destroyed by substituting equality in plaoe 
of proportional representation, no proper super-structure could be 
raised. If the s1~11 States wanted a government strong enough to 
regula te the large states, they were mistaken in their means. 18 
The Artic.les, said Madison, had fettered. the oentral author-
ity so that it was inoapable of controlling the nation. As rep-
resentation was a 8ubsti tll.te far meetings of the people I the rep-
resentatives should have voting power in proportion to their con-
stituents. If the alleged distinction tha:b the government was 
partly National, partly Federal, was correct, he was willing to 
acoede to it. 
l7Ibid 
_e 
l8Ibid• 
-
If the government was National alone, he was uu-
303. 
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willing to allow anything but Covernment of' the people. 19 In all 
cases where the government a.cts on the people, he insisted that 
the people be represented by proportional votes. In cases where 
the government acts on the States, let the States have an equal 
vote. He said that if there was ground for compromise, this was 
the place, but he thought there was no real room :ror compromise. 20 
Madison thought that the people of large States, if unable to 
obtain adequate power through proportional :representation, would 
obstruct the govarnmen·t until they were able to exercise their due 
influence. Even the existing Confederacy allowed extra in:fluence 
by larger states. Nowhere at that time, in or out of Congress, 
did Delaware rival Virginia. I.f the latter supplied ten times the 
money Delaware supplied, she deserved ten times the number of rep-
resentatives or Delaware. 21 
He then Gm;unerated the objectiontJ agatns t equa.lity of" voting 
• power 1n the Senate, evan if proport10n~l representation were al-
lowed in the Lower House. He contended that e. majol"lty could neg-
ative the will of the majority; that they could extort measures by 
making suoh measures a condi tion of their cooperation., 'l'bey could 
.force measures on a majority through their influenoe in the Senate 
The evil, he thought, would increase with every state admitted. 
60 
Furthermore, the perpetuity it would give rlorthern preponderance 
was to hinl a sellious consideration. 22 
M,adlson then made an acute observation that would be verified 
in the .future. "It seemed now .... that the real di.ff'erence of' 1n-
tel'ests lay, not between the la:rge and small, but between the HOll .... 
thern and Southelln States. The :tnsti tution of slavery and its 
23 
consequences formed the line of dis crimination. n It was tllue 
that even 1n proportional represontation, the north would out-
number the South, but not ,in the same degree as if equal replles-
entation was allowed in the Senate. 
Despite Madison's efforts, and the ora tol":r of Pinckney a.nd 
Wilson, the motion passed in the negat1 ve. 2!j.. The compromise sub. 
n'lltted by the committee of elaven was here to stay. Madison 
clrudgingly accepted the compromise as unfair to the majority of 
the people. 
Thus, we see that Madison sought to abolish what he consider-
ed a printe weakness in the Articles, equality' of suffrage. He de-
fended his new plan of proportional represents. tion a.s an excellent 
mode or transferring power from the States to the people. By bas-
ing suffrage on the people, the National C-overnment was to be de-
pendent on the people. The stutes were to resemble Counties with-
22Ibid• 
23 
roid. 381. 
-
a, _ 
in a state.. If a goverttI'11Gnt VIas baaed prim'irily on the States, 
then t:hat government was weak and the states were strong.. It' the 
govel"'nr.1ent was based primarily on the people, then that government 
was strone and independent. Madison reminded his fallow delegates 
that they were replacing a Federal Government with a 11ational one. 
A Ii'sderal Goverllillent VJas dependant on the States; a stronger one ~ 
a Uational one, was based on the people. 
Madison also argued that a lUGer State, with a large!' popu .... 
lation, deserved a larger franchise. v~t}wr he was truly con-
cerned with the ttinjustice lJ involved, or whetr...er he used this ar-
gument to st!'ongthen his bid for governraent based on the people 1s 
not claar. 
It should be remembered that Madison was wholly for p!'opor-
tional representation. A study of his notes reveals that he op-
posed the oompromise beoause it did ~ot allow proportional repres-
entation in both branohes. It does seem clear that he Vlish:~d to 
-
get away trom a Congress of jealous and selfish states, and to 
oonstruot a Congress or American Congressmen. 
, 
GHAPTER VI 
Professor Jensen, in. his book, ~ Articlos 2£. Coni'ederation, 
dei'ends the Articles as a philosophical out-growth of the Declara-
tion ot: Independence.1 'l11e Articles of Confederation achieved de-
centralization of: the states .fI"om the British Empire. Once thia 
decentralization had been achieved, there was a. need for strencr,th ... 
ening the central governroont. Congress lacked suffiCient poweI" to 
suppress internal rebellion, to regulate trade, and to control the 
. 2 disrupt:t ve tendencies of state GOV0I"nments. Men like !1adison, 
Washington, and Hamilton I"ealized the need for a radical revision 
of the AI"ticles, or tlw drafting oi' a new Constitution. 
Washington, Hamilton, ;!filson, 8h8nnan, 1-;101"'1' is I and many oth-
" 
" 
ers contI"ibuted to our American Constitution, but the man who 1ms 
gone down in histoI"Y as the ltFatherf1 of this docUu"lent, is Jat'l'l0s 
Madison, of Virginia. By reason of' his \170I"k before and durin:~~ the 
Federal Convention of 1787, his forceful argmnents at the subse-
quent Virginia. Convention for ratification, and h1s cogent reason-
lJensen, Artioles, 2.39. 
2Ibid• 2111 
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6.3 
ing in the li1ed~~y.aJ.is.t, Madison earned the title of "Pather" of our 
Constitution. 
In this study we discussed 'Madison's Doctrine of liational 
Sovereignty at the Convention of 1787. Although his work at the 
Virginia Convention, and his wri tings for the ~.~_alist, contrib-
uted to the adoption of' the Gonstltution, his work at the Phila-
delphia Convention won him fame for all ages as a poli tical phil-
osopher. In later years, his Doctrine of national Sovereignty 
would evolve into a. doctrine which allowed more sovereignty to the 
states.3 Madison later changed his views because he feared the 
1· Federal Government was going too far in its centralization. L+ Al .. 
though the evolution of his doctrine is not discussed here, it 
should be noted that his ideas on centralization did evolve, and 
that those who oite Madison as a defender of such centralization 
as oocur in the nineteen Thirties, do not completely understand 
tl~ evolution or his politioal ph1loso~hy. 
VIe a.ttempted to traoe Madison's Doctrine of national Sovw-
e1gnty as he expressed it in the s~~er or 1787, at Philadelphia. 
Madison oonsidered the Articles of C::ont'ederation dangel'ously in-
adequate :for the pro6sel"Vat10n of o'L.tt' National atl:'ength and unity. 
3Brant. L~65.. In the Chapter on the famous Virginia Resolu-
tion, Brant eives another reason for Madison's posthumous publi-
cation of his notes on the debates; he feared his argu..rnenta might 
add to a. trend toward despotism. 
4Ibid • 11.52-11.71. 
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He lat:1.ented the dangerous weaknesses of the Articles of COnf'edertl-
tion that threatened to destroy the Country. So determined was he 
to forge a mighty "chain of irontt that 'WOuld bind the States tight... 
ly together in corporate unity, that he arrived in Philadelphia, 
early in Ylay, bofore the other delsgs. tea. It quorum was not pres ... 
~ 
ont until Yday 25.':> 
Before enough delegates arrived to conduct business, Madison 
wafted the famous Virginia Plan, a Plan of government to be pres .. 
ented by Governor Randolph, which would emerge, in many respeots, 
as our finished Constitution. 
Throughout the confusion and friction that threatened to dis-
rupt the gathering, I~tadison led the fight for National soverei;::7lty 
He was opposed, i'or the most part, by members of the small state 
bloc, men who feared their states' sovere:1gnty would be submerged 
in an amorphous sovernment of the people. Even to a oasual reader 
of Madison's notes, it 1s apparent tha.t Madison was on his" feet 
'whenever a chance pres en ted i tsel!' to advance or to seoond SOl'1l$ 
motion to strengthen the National Government, and to curtail or 
destroy the centrifugal tendenoy of the states. To study all the 
arguments of Madison, 'muld be to study almost evett"y word he ut-
tered at Philadelphia, that summer of 1737. We selected what we 
consider four outstanding strands of his contemplated tapestry ot 
National C'rOverrunent, namely. popular eleotion ot: Pres ident and Con-
5Ke11y and Harbison • .!t!!. American Gonst! tutioq, 115. 
, 
eress, a Federal negatIve, Q st1"ong Exeoutive. and propol'ltlonal 
representation. Fl'om these .t"OUl'" we can deduoe Madisonts philoso-
phy or fYvernment that summer, and his work for a strong cent1"al 
government based on the people. 
Sometimes, Madison did get what he wanted. A t other ti:nes ~ 
he did not. Of the arguments he lost, it was better for poste1"lty 
that he did 1008.6 The compromise of equal representation 1n the 
Senate, for exa.mple, has worked better for the Country than Mad-
ison could have dreamed in 1787. VJhether he won or lost, his 
splI'1t usually dominated. the outcome of an issue. He feared the 
interferenoe of state Legisla.tures in the National Government. To 
obviate undue state interferenoe, he proposed popular election of 
the President, so that the Magistrate might be independent of the 
tegislat'lrras, both state and Fe<ie1"al. He proposed popular eleo-
tion of at least one branoh ot' the llatlonal It8g1slature to prevent 
state interferenoe in the tegislati vet " . If the people were" not to 
elect both branohes, then tho first whioh was elected by the peo-
ple, was to elect the seoond. Thus, the people would oontrol the 
first branoh directly, the second lndtreotly_ And neither branoh 
would l~ve to depend on the states, or any other Agency in the 
National Government. 
Madison haa been ridiculed for his proposal of a Foderal neg-
ative of conflicting state laws. Suoh oritioism ignores the faot 
%rant, 128. 
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that, evon though 'the negative itself was unworkable, still Mad-
ison achieved his end with the adoption or Judicial review. Per-
haps he did not know it at the time, but Judicia.l review as pro-
posed in the New Jersey Plan, n~de the Constitution the supreme 
law or the land.7 Madison lmd proposed a nega ti ve, because he 
reared, under the new Constitution, a recurrence of tl~ same dif-
ficulties that harassed the impotent Congress under the Articles. 
There was a definite weakness :tn fliadison's proposed negatIve, a 
weakness that was removed by Judicial review and the "Supreme Lawif 
Doctrine. Andrew I:IoLaughlin says that Madison and other defendors 
of the negative were comparine the projected govern.ment with 1'01"-
n 
mer British rule. U At best, the negative 'illould have made way for 
arbi trary rule by the Hational Legislature, suoh as existed even 
without a negative dUl."ing the black days of re-oonstruotion. The 
negative was chosen :tor a Chapter of this study, not because it 
was a canny proposal, but beoause it illustrates Madisonfs'zeal 
for a strong g'Overnment. 
Madison fou~pt for a strong Executive, elected not by state 
IJGg1slatures, but by the people. As a .fot'!oor member of Congress, 
he knew first-hand the piti:f'ul attempts of fumbling Executive com-
mittees under the Artiolos~ Although he wanted a strone, inde-
pendent President, it is not true tl1at he wanted any semblanoe of. 
r, 
'McLaughlin, Gonfedera tion, 206. 
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rnonarcby. Hor did he leave the door open for future monarohy. He 
concurred Vii th hfs fellow 01 t1zens in tIle desire to p!'event the 
advent of :future despots, and forr:1od bulwarks against th:!.s danger 
by h1s proposed checks on the Execut:tve. Since for strong gov-
erru,'lOut the department tbat executes the laws must be strong, 'IJad-
1aon proposed a strong l~eoutive. And since for an independent 
government tho 1f::Xecuti va cannot be dependent on parts of the whole, 
but must be dependent on the people, the oitizens of' the whr..)le, 
Madison proposed popular, not Legislative, election of the rJragls-
trate. 
He proposed and argued for proportional rEllpresentation, not 
only in the IJOwer House, but in the Senate as well. His arguments 
for pl-'oport1onal representation in tlJa Lower House must have con-
vinoed most of his fellow delegates, but the Senate was nl10tted 
two members i'l?om each S ta to. This comprorllise warded off disrup-
tion of the Convention by disgruntled ~.mall State delegates. L;e.d-
180n never dreamed in 1787, that futw.--e years would sOi'lletirnes find 
the Senate more Nationalistic than the House of' Representatives. 
Madison was an ardent Nationalist at the Convention of 1787. 
With his arsrum.ents for a strong go vernm.ent , he dissipated much ig-
norance and convinced his fellow leaders that America needed a 
Constitution s1lililar to the one he espoused. He deserves his hon-
ored place in American history for his work at the Convention. He 
deserves the ti tle he bea.rs, that of ttFather of our Constitution. n 
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